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In the Supre01e Court of the 
State of Utah 
JOHN S. IDA VIS d/b/a 
GENEVA LUMBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PAYNE AND DAY, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I 
\ 
CASE 
NO. 9386 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover $7,294.61 for 
materials claimed to have been furnished to defendant on 
the three count alternative theories of goods sold and de-
• livered, quantum meruit, and open account. The first ap-
peal was from an order granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the close of the first trial. This court reversed, 
and the case was tried a second time. This appeal is taken 
from a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered at the con-
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elusion of the second trial and from an order overruling 
defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant shall be 
hereinafter referred to as appellant and plaintiff as re-
spondent. 
The appellant, Payne and Day, Inc., a Utah corpora-
tion, during the year 1957 contracted for the construction 
of sixty-one homes in the Orem-Provo area for sale to in-
terested buyers. The homes were built successively in five 
different groups beginning with a group of ten homes in 
Rose Garden Subdivision at Orem, and when that was 
completed, the remaining four groups of homes were con-
structed in Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo. Appellant em-
ployed C. E. Slavens as construction superintendent un-
der separate contracts covering each group of homes in 
which his duties, authority, and compensation were spe-
cificaly defined, (Exhibits 20, 21, 22). The construction 
superintendent procured bids from subcontractors on the 
labor and materials necessary for the construction of each 
home in each group, including respondent, and presented 
the same to appellant. Appellant then attached the bid to 
a written agreement with respondent, of which it was 
made a part, providing for the furnishing of two pack-
ages of building materials in connection with each home 
in each group of homes, (Exhibits 6 through 11). In these 
contracts, the parties fixed a single unit home price and 
appellant inserted in each the following provision: 
• 
"It is mutually agreed that any additions or deletions 
in the materials to be furnished are to be given in 
writing by party of second part (appellant) to the 
first par.ty, and the value of the change, based upon 
pri~ces quoted in the attached list, shall either be 
added or subtracted from the original contract.'' 
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The parties entered into five separate .contracts on 
the five groups of homes in question; the first is darted 
February 21, 1957, and it covered ten homes in Rose Gar-
den Subdivision, Orem, (Exhibit 6); the next is dated 
March 16, 1957, and it covered eleven homes in Mount 
Aire Subdivision, Provo, (Exhibit 10); the next was made 
June 3, 1957, and it covered sixteen homes in Mount Aire 
Subdivision, Provo, (Exhibit 8); the next is dated July 
26, 1957, and it covered eleven homes in Mount Aire Sub-
division, Provo, (Exhibit 7); and one dated September 
3, 1957, covering twelve homes in the Mount Aire Subdi-
vision, Provo, (E~hibit 9). There was also a contract 
dated September 23, 1957, covering one home in the Wes-
tern Manor Subdivision, Orem, (Exhibit 11). These con-
tracts all incorporated respondent's bids for furnishing 
all materials necessary for the construction of each home 
unit through second and final F. H. A. inspections. With 
the exception of the designation of the group of homes 
covered, these ~contracts contained substantially identical 
pr·ovisions, and for that reason we will refer to respond-
ent's Exhibit 6 to illustrate the contract provisions. 
Exhibit 6 covers the Rose Garden group of homes at 
Orem. It provides that respondent shall fwnish mate-
rials for plan No. 485, schemes 1, 2, and 3, as per "attached 
lists", which become a part of the agreement, "for the 
price of $2,116.00". It required the specified grade and 
quality indicated by the list and deliver-y within 15 days 
after being ordered by the appellant. The attached lists 
are entitled "Building Material List for Three Bedroom 
House-Garage Plan with gabled front porch plan 485, 
Package No. 1-Schemes 1, 2, 3." This list then specifies 
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in detail the numbe·r of units and the kind and quality of 
materials necessary to complete the package and prices 
out each unit and shows a package number 1 total net 
priee of $1,610.00. Then follows a list similarly titled 
for "package No. 2, schedules 1, 2, and 3," likewise de-
tailing the materials and showing the net price for pack-
age No. 2 of $506.00. The contract then provides for the 
above quoted writing in case there are any "additions or 
deletions" in the list. It is further provided that mate-
rials shall be stacked on the job site in good order and in 
accordanee with the supeTintendent's instructions; that 
the contract priee shall hold for ninety days at which 
time adjustments shall be made in accordance with cur-
rent market prices; that appellant will purchase the ma-
terial at the named price as needed; that payment for 
materials delivQ.red is to be made on the 10t;h of the month 
following delivery to the 27th of the preceding month; 
"that delivery will be made and billed by package num-
ber as pe(I' attached list"; and the agreement covers the 
ten houses in Rose Garden Subdivision. The houses de-
scribed in this contract were built and the parties fully 
performed their agreement. 
On March 28 1957, respondent, Geneva Lumber Com-
pany, billed appellant for materials furnished as called 
for in package No. 1 under the contmct, Exhibit 6, which 
comprised the framing materials taking each house up 
to second F. H. A. inspection. A receipt dated April 10, 
1957, for $16,100 was thereupon given by respondent to 
appellant a-cknowledging payment for the materials in 
package No. 1, (E~hibit 12). Also, on April 10, 1957, 
respondent executed and delivered to appellant a receipt 
on each home unit described in E~hibit 6 for the sum of 
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$1610.00 reciting that it was "In full payment for ma-
terials furnished" as required by package No. 1 of Ex-
hibit 6. Likewise on April 27, 1957, respondent billed 
app2Uant for materials furnished in package No. 2 on each 
house unit described in Exhibit 6 and on May 10, 1957, 
gave a separate receipt and lien waiver acknowledging 
payment in full for each unit package No. 2 materials as 
required by the contract, Exhibit 6, (Ex. 12; Tr. 132). 
Identical contracts were made between these same parties 
on each of the other groups of homes (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 
and 11) pursuant to which respondent furnished the ma-
terials called for by package No. 1 and package No. 2 for 
each unit and gave receipts in full on each home unit for 
all materials furnished for same, as well as lien waivers 
thereon. (E~hibits 13 A and B, 14 A, B, and C, 15 A, B, 
and C, 16 A, B, C, and D). 
TI\ree months after the date of the last contract (re-
spondent's Exhibit 11) and after all of the contracts had 
been fully performed, including those of C. E. Slavens, the 
general superintendent, appeUant corporation received a 
communication from Slavens (Exhibit 31) dated Janu-
ary 27, 1958, enclosing a statement from respondent for 
"extras on the 73 homes" in the amount of $8398.30, and 
which included documents in the nature of itemized state-
ments, in which Slavens stated, "I need not say that the 
entire bill is utterly ridiculous." Although the respondent 
did not send this statement directly to the appellant, but 
rather, sent same to Slavens, who was no longer employed 
by appellant and was then in Blanding, Utah, and this was 
the first notice appellant had been given that respondent 
was making claim for extras under the contracts in ques-
tion, (Tr. 487-488), respondent, John Davis, admitted that 
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he was well aware of the eontract provision (Tr. 421-423) 
requiring a "writing if there were any additions or dele~ 
tions": and that he tried to get appellant on the telephone 
for the purpose of procuring the writing but was un.able 
to do so, (Tr. 410). He also admitted that no writing 
was procured from the appel1ant authorizing any of the 
additions of materials which he claims to have furnished. 
Slavens denied that he ever told respondent that the re-
quired writing would not be necessary, (Tr. 567-570, 578-
580). Slavens did admit receiving, on or about July 1, 
1957, a statement from respondent, (Exhibit 19) for 
$623.36 tor extras on "Cherry Lane Project," (Tr. 571-
572), and that he talked to respondent, John Davis' wife, 
and she told him it was sent out by mistake. 
Respondent offered, as evidence of his claimed extras 
allegedly furnished appellant in the construction of the 
homes in question, three paper back books (E)cirlbits 1, 2, 
and 3,) containing numerous undated entries of materials 
claimed to have been furnished as "additions" to the lists 
attached to the contracts, (Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). 
The tabs attached to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the red pencil-
ing and the crosses appearing therein were added by the 
witnesses who identified same. Appellant made timely 
objections to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and all oral evidence go-
ing to the idenrtifieation and explanation of same, and also 
to respondent's Exhibits 4 and 5 (Tr. 70-90), summariz-
ing the reasoning process employed by the witnesses, mak-
ing conclusions from the entries in the three books as to 
priees and materials. Appellant's objection to this evi-
dence was made on the ground that its admission would 
be a violation of the parol evidence rule in view of the 
"additions and deletions" provision contained in the con-
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tracts in question, and on the further ground tha:t the evi-
dence was self-serving and immaterial, (Tr. 47-53). The 
Court admitted this evidence despite appellant's objections. 
Respondent used the date of the making of the con-
tracts 6 through 11 respectively, to fix the time when the 
alleged extras were furnished, and thus ties Exhibit 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 directly into the contracts mentioned, (Tr. 154-
158). Thus, the respondent dates the alleged delivery of 
materials by reasoning that this nebulous mass must have 
been furnished at the very time appellant was furnishing 
materials under the above mentioned contracts, and in vi-
olation of the "additions" provision of the same. 
Respondent elaimed that Slavens authorized the re-
spondent to furnish the claimed extras appearing in Ex-
hibits 1, 2, and 3, (Tr. 42-45; 84-86), but there is no evi-
dence in the record that Slavens had any suoh authority, 
either express or implied. Over our objection, the court 
allowed the respondent to prove Slavens' authority by the 
above-mentioned extra-judicial statements he was alleged 
to have made to respondent. 
The authority of Slavens to bind appellant is shown 
by the eontracts under which he was employed. In fact, 
appellant required a contract with each of the persons who 
had any part in the eonstruction of the homes in question, 
including the furnishing of materials. In each such case, 
appellant protected itself as far as "additions and deletions" 
were conce~rned by the above quoted contractual provision 
appearing in each contract. 
Appellant relies for a reversal of the trial court upon 
the following: 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE PAROL EVDENCE RULE IS APPLICABLE 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ORAL EVI-
DENCE OF CLAIMED EXTRAS VIS-A-VIS THE CON-
TRACTUAL PROVISION REQUIRING A WRITING IN 
THE EVENT ADDITIONAL MATERIALS WERE 
NEEDED. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN EVI-
DENCE THE ALLEGED ORAL EXTRA- JUDICIAL 
STATEMENTS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO 
RESPONDENT BY SLAVENS, THE CONSTRUCTION 
SUPERINTENDENT OF APPELLANT, GOING TO THE 
EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF IllS AUTHORITY AS 
AN AGENT. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMI'ITING EVIDENCE 
(1) THAT APPELLANT HlAD IN CONNECTION WITH 
A CO'NTRAcr NOT IN ISSUE OR BEFORE THE COURT 
IN THE INSTANT CASE PAID FOR ADDITIONAL MA-
TERIALS FURNISHED, THOUGH NOT AUTHORIZED 
IN WRITING, AND (2) ALSO ORAL AND WRI'ITEN 
SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS PERTAINING TO 
AN ACCOUNT THERETOFORE ACKNOWLEDGED TO 
HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUIDG-
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MENT, FINDING AND HOLDING THAT APPELLANT'S 
GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT HAD BOTH APP AR-
ENT AND ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE 
PRO·VISIONS OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRING A 
WRITING SIGNED BY APPELLANT FO·R EXTRA MA-
TERIAL NOT CALLE.D FOR BY THE CO·NTRACT. 
THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME. 
POINT V 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE "LAW OF THE CASE" 
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE ·CO·URT FROM CONSID-
ERING APPELLANT'S POINTS MADE HEREIN DE-
SPITE THE ADVERSE HO·LDING ON THE FIRST AP-
PEAL. 
THE BASIC ISSUE 
Appellant, Payne and Day Inc., is a Utah corporation 
wholly owned by Afton M. Payne and Henry Day, who sup-
plied capital for the construction business, but who did 
not participate actively in its building program. The 61 
homes in question were constructed under contracts with 
several individuals, including respondent, who contracted 
to furnish the necessary materials (Exhibits 6 through 11). 
There was also a separate contract with Slavens to super-
vise the construction work and act as construction super-
intendent. Thus appellant, having contractually established 
its costs foT the construction of each of the homes in ques-
tion, proceeded with its business venture. Appellant cov-
enanted with respondent, in order to stabilize and eontrol 
its costs so established, that written authority for "addi-
tions'' should be procured from its owners. Hence the 
above quoted provision. In this regard, Slavens' contract 
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was significantly silent and respondent's was explicit. Ap-
pellant complains bitterly that this protective provision was 
held for naught on the admission in evidence over objection 
of the extra-judicial statements of Slavens that he had au-
1Jhor1ty to \vaive the said provision. We believe appellant 
had a legal right to the protection of rthe provision in ques-
tion and that the trial court erred in admitting this evi-
dence. Although respondent claimed a bill of more tha11 
$7,000.00 in extras, allegedly incurred over rthe period of 
the entire construction of the 61 homes in question, no 
demand was made rto appellant for written authority to 
furnish such extras, despite the aforesaid 1contract provi-
sion. And as each of the contracts were performed (Ex-
hibit 6-11), respondent billed appellant as required there-
by ,and was paid for all materials furnished, and gave re-
ceipts and lien waivers on each of the houses in question. 
But no mention was made to appellant that any extras 
were claimed by respondent until three months after the 
performance of the last contract. Appellant complains 
that respondent and Slavens, in effect, were allowed by 
the trial court to bypass, by a secret conspiracy, the cru-
cial contract provision appellant's owners had placed in 
the contracts for irts protection. Certainly, appellant had 
a right to rely on the contractual provisions, and it com-
plains that the C·ourt bypassed and ignored the same in 
aw·arding judgmenrt to respondent. 
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THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PAROL EVDENCE RULE IS APPLICABLE 
AND· THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ORAL EVI-
DENC'E O·F CLAIMED EXTRAS VIS-A-VIS THE CON-
TRACTUAL PRO·VISION REQUIRING A WRITING IN 
THE EVENT AD·D~ITIONAL MATERIALS WERE 
NEEDED. 
It is obvious that the provision with respect to addi-
tional material bing required to be in writing is a con-
tractual provision of ·the written contracts in question. 
There is no evidence that there was ever any written au-
thority given by the appellant to respondent to furnish 
any ex-Was as claimed by respondent. Under these cir-
cumstances the respondent is barred from offering parol 
testimony that he furnished additional materials under 
the contract without producing a writing signed by ap-
pellant which -complies with the terms of the said provi-
sion of the contract. The trial court refused to apply the 
parol evidence rule although it is firmly established in 
Utah la\v. Of the parol evidence rule, this Court in Gar-
rett v. Ellison (1937) 98 Utah 184, 72 P 2d 449, 129 A. 
L. R. 669, has the following to say: 
" .... The rule, so called, may be stated thus. Parol 
evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter, control, or 
contradict the terms of a written instrument, in an 
action founded upon such writing, between the par-
ties or privies thereto . . . . and the rule only ap-
plies to those elements or parts of the writing which 
are contractual between the parties and not merely 
recitals of fact . . . a rule has been established that 
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an agreement by parol which is collateral to the 
written contreot and on a distinct subject may be 
proved. To lay down, in advance, a distinct formula 
that will determine by "rule of thumb" what cases 
come within it, is difficult ... the rule is founded 
upon the principle that when the parties have discussed 
and agreed upon their obligations to each other, and 
reduced those terms to writing, that such terms, if 
elear and unambiguous, furnish better and more def-
inite evidence of what was undertaken by each par-
ty than the too often fickle memory of man, or why 
else reduce it to writing. The rule applies to exclude 
extrinsic utterances, when it is sought to use those 
uttemnces for the purpose for which the writing was 
made and have superseded them as the legal act." 
See also Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. et al v. 
Harsh Utah Corporation (1956) 5 Utah 2d 244; Fullmer 
et al v. Morrill et eux. (1954) 2 Urtah 2d 347; 3 Jones 
Comn1entaries on Evidence, Sec. 1484. 
Again \Ve point out that appellant corporation was 
in a large building enterprise and the corporate officers 
did not have direct supervision of the work. For that 
resaon it employed a construction superintendent and gave 
him supervisory authority only. Appellant also made sep-
arate !Contract with all the other subcontractors who par-
ticipated in any way in the construction, among which re-
spondent had the written conrtracts for furnishing mate-
ri·als under the package method of contracting. Appel-
lant had a right to protect itself from claims for extras 
and did so by inserting in each contmct the provision with 
respect to furnishing additional materials. Commenting 
upon this phase of the application of the parol evidence 
rule, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Jenkins Used Cars 
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vs. James G. Rice (1958) 7 Utah 2d, 276, 277, 323 P. 2d 
259: 
"But it is also elementary and of extreme practical im-
portance that we hold contracting parties to their 
clear and understandable language deliberately com-
mitted to writing and endorsed by them as signatories 
thereto. WeTe this nort so, business one with another 
among our citizens, would be relegated to the chaotic, 
and the basic purpose otf the law, to supply enforce-
able rules of conduct for the ~maintenance and improve-
ment of an orderly society's welfare and progress, 
would find itself impotent. It is nort unreasonable to 
hold one responsible for language which he himself 
espouses. Such language is the only implement he 
gives us to fashion a determination as to the inten-
tions of the parties. Under such circumsttances we 
should not be required to embosom any request that 
we ignore that very language. This is as it should 
be. The rule excluding matters outside the four cor-
ners of a elear, understandable document, is a fair 
one, and one's contentions concerning his intent should 
extend no further than his own clear e~pressions.'' 
We do not think respondent can arrange with anyone 
to circumvent such written provision requiring written 
authority for the furnishing of any extras, rely upon the 
contracts, r2eeive payment and receipt in full for materi-
als furnished under same, and then, after complete per-
formance, for the first time, make these surprise claims 
of extras that had been furnished. We believe thart it was 
prejudicial error for the trial court to permit oral evidence 
which varied the terms of the written contractual provi-
sion inserted in the contract for the protection of the offi-
cers and owners of appellant corporation. 
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POINT IT 
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN EVI-
DEN~CE THE ALLEGED OJ{.AL EXTRA- JUDICIAL 
STATEMENTS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO 
RESPONDENT BY SLAVENS, THE CONSTRUCTION 
SUPERINTENDENT OF APPELLANT, GOING TO THE 
EXISTEN~CE AND EXTENT OF HIS AUTHORITY AS 
AN AGENT. 
The trial court permitted respondent's evidence of al-
leged oral extra-judicial statements of S1avens that he had 
authority to waive the aforesaid "additions and deletions" 
provisions of ·the conrtract~ in question. Such evidence 
is the sole basis for holding that appellant waived the 
contractual provisions in question. Respondent claimed 
that these oral statements were made by Slavens at Ge-
neva's office in July of 1957; and that they were to the 
effect that respondent oould keep a separate record of 
the claimed extras and that same would be kept secret 
from appellant. It was claimed that this amounted to 
· rsepondent and appellant entering into an oral agreement 
to waive the writing requirement provision for extras con-
tained in the said contracts. T<his is the evidence allowed 
by the Court. We submit that the construction super-
intendent's contract with appellant must be viewed in the 
light of the contractual provision in respondent's con-
tracts requiring the writing in the event additional mat~ 
rials are required. Clearly this limi~ts the construction 
superintendent's authority to supervision of the conso--uc-
tion work, and any oral statement which he might make 
to respondent, who was a party to the contracts in ques-
tion, could not possibly be construed to be binding upon 
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appellant. An agent's authority cannot be shown by re-
liance on oral declarations the alleged agent is supposed 
to have made. The applicable rule of law in this regard 
is stated in A. L. I. Restatement: Agency 2d, Section 
285, beginning page 5, as follows: 
"Evidence of a statement by an agent concerning the 
existence or extent of his authority is not admissible 
against he priincipal to prove its existence or extent, 
unless it appears by other evidence that the making 
of such statement was within the authority of the 
agent or , as to persons dealing with the agent, with-
in the apparent authority or other power of rtJhe 
agent.'' 
'fhe following comments are made beginning page 5 
under the above quoted rule as follows: 
"a. The rule stated in this seotion does not deal with 
testimony by an agent . . ." 
"d. . . . On the orther hand, unless it is proved that 
the speaker was an agent and that the statement 
was within his power as such agent, evidence of the 
statement is inadmissible . . . '' 
See also 2 American Jurisprudence, Section 445; and 
3 A.L.R. 2d 602, where it is said: 
''In cases too numerous to be exhaustively collected, 
the proposition has been announced that, as against 
the principal, evidence of extra-judicial statements 
of an alleged agent is not admissible to show the 
facts of agency or the extent or scope thereof.'' 
In A. L. I. Restatement: Agency, 2d, Section 8, ap-
parent authority is defined as follows: 
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''Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal 
relations of another person by transactions with third 
person, professedly as agent for the other, arising 
from and in accordance with the others manifesta-
tions to such a third person.'' 
The following cor.ament on the foregoing rule as to 
apparent authority is made beginning, Ibid., on page 30 
as follows: 
"a. Apparent authority results from a manifestation 
by a person that another is his agent, the manifes-
tation being made to a third person, and not, as when 
authority is created, to the agent. It is entirely di-
tinct from authority, either express or implied ... " 
"c. Belief by a third person. Apparent authority ex-
ists only to tlhe eJ\.'tent that it is reasonable for the 
third person dealing with tlle agent to believe that 
the agent is authorized. Further, the third person 
n1ust believe the agent to be authorized. In this re-
spect apparent authority differs from authority, since 
an agent who is authorized can bind the principal to 
the transaction with a third person who does not 
believe the agent to be authorized." 
This Court stated in its opinion on the first appeal, 
Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc .. 10 Ut. 2d 53, 56, that "It 
is a \Veil established rule of law that parties to a written 
contract may modify, waive, or make ne\v terms notwith-
standing terms in the contract designed to hamper such 
freedom." We recognize this rule of law but contend that 
under the evidence in the instant case, in both the first 
and second trials, it has no application. In support of this 
rule, the opinion cites the case of Salzner v. Jos. J. Snell 
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Estate Corp., 81 Utah 111, 16 P. 2d 923, and comments 
on it ibid 57 as follows: 
"The facts are similar to those in Salzner v. Jos. J. 
Snell Estate Corp., wherein this court held that re-
quirement in a written agreement that no alteration 
should be made in the written order of the architect 
containing ,the amount to be paid for such alteration 
did not preclude a recovery for alterations made on 
new plans and specifications not contemplated in the 
original agreement although the alterations were on 
the same building which was the subject of the writ-
ten agreement, because the parties actually entered 
into a new agreement and the defendant was there-
fore liable for the work and materials it received from 
the plaintiff in that action." 
We do not agree that the facts of the instant case 
are similar to those of the Snell case; in faot, we would 
like to point out that they are entirely different. 
In the Snell case there was an agreement between 
plaintiff and defendant whereby the plaintiff contractor 
agreed to remodel a building in Salt Lake City. The work 
was to be done under the direction of the defendant's ar-
chitect, whose decision was to be final as to the meaning 
of the plans and specifications. 'f,he contract provided that 
additional drawings and specifications, if necessary, to il-
lustrate the work were to be furnished by the architect. 
There was a provision in the contract that "no alterations 
shall be made in the work except upon written order of 
the architect; ... " Plaintiff contractor recovered a judg-
ment for "alterations" from the original plans and defend-
ant claime the archiect's writing had not been procured. 
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":Dhe Court states in the Pacific Report, page 925, as fol-
lows: 
"The work was done under the direction of the defend-
ant's architect; the manager of the defendant com-
pany visited the building frequently as the work pro-
gressed and was familiar with the alte~ations that 
were being made and made no objection whatever to 
the work as it was done. The architect testified that 
he issued a final certificate to the plaintiff that theTe 
was due him for extra work the sum of $1757.80 in 
whtch was included the amount of $1111.00 for the 
extra work at the front of the building; that the al-
terations were made under his supervision; and that 
he made a new sketch for the front in which were em-
bodied the suggestions of the building inspector, and 
as he recollected it, he received the instructions to 
proceed from Mr. Snell, the manager of the defend-
ant, and the certificate whieh he issued covered this 
extra work on the front as well as other extras." 
Obviously, the defendant corporate owner had agreed 
with the plaintiff contractor in the written contract that 
the order for the extras must be upon its architect's writ-
ing and this is what was done. The situation in the in-
stant case is wholly different in that the appellant. Payne 
and Day, Inc., agreed in writing with respondent, not that 
its superintendent could waive the provision requiring a 
writing in the event additional materials \Yere furnished, 
but that the \vriting was to be furnished by the appellant, 
and no request was ever made of and no such writing was 
ever given by the appellant. In the Snell case, the defend-
ant's architect changed the plans ·and specifications to 
meet the requirements of the building inspector of Salt 
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Lal{e City. The extras that had to be done were not, 
therefore, included in the original contract, and the cotJrt 
so held. The extra work was in effect a new contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant to which the defendant 
agreed and in fact, his anchitect drew the plans for the 
extra work. In the Snell case the corporate O\vner con-
tracted ~that this whole business should be handled by its 
manager and the crucial provision was the extras should 
only be paid for upon written order of its architect. 
Whereas, in the instant case the appellant, to protect it-
self, limited the authority of its construction superinten-
dent to supervision of the work, and contracted with re-
spondent that in the event additional materials were re-
quired that it should be only upon the written authority 
of appellant. Such a provision was erucial to ihe protec-
tion of the corporation with respect to "additions" or ex-
tras, and a great injustice to the owners and officers of 
appellant will result if the trial eourt's ruling that the 
contractual provision in question is to be circumvented and 
ignored, is allowed to stand. 
Under these authorities, the alleged statements of Sla-
vens were inadmissible as they did not constitute a rep-
resentation by the appellant to the respondent that the 
claimed authority existed, and the Court erred in allow-
ing such evidence to come in. 
Rather than there being a representation from appel-
lant that Slavens had authority to waive the eontractual 
provisions in question by reason of the alleged oral state-
ments, the respondent should have been estopped to as-
sert that such statements were made. Respondent at all 
times during the performance of the contracts in ques-
tion relied upon them, billed appellant at the conclusion 
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of each, and was paid according to the billing and receipted 
appellant for full payment of all of the materials fur-
nished rmder all of the contracts. Respondent seems to 
have conspired with Slavens to keep secret what was go-
ing on between respondent and Slavens concerning the 
claimed extras all during the period of February, 1957, 
until November, 1957, when all of these contracts were 
being perlormed, then some three months later claimed 
that he had furnished extras despite the "additions and 
deletions'' provisions of the said contracts. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
(1) THAT APPELLANT HAD IN CONNECTION WITH 
A CONTRACT NOT IN ISSUE OR BEFORE THE COURT 
IN THE INSTANT CASE PAID FOR ADDITIONAL MA-
TERI_t\.LS FURNISHED, THOUGH NOT AUTHORIZED 
IN WRITING, AND (2) ALSO, ORAL AND' WRfi.I'EN 
SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS PERTAINING TO 
AN ACCO·UNT TI-IERETOFORE ACKNOWLEDGED TO 
I-IA VE BEEN PAID IN FULL. 
(1) The Court admitted evidence over appellant's 
objection to the effect that respondent had been paid for 
additional materials furnished under roofing contracts on 
some of the same houses contemplated by the instant suit, 
although appellant did not authorize these extra roofing 
materi·als in writing, as required by the roofing contract. 
These roofing contracts were not the subject of the in-
stant suit, and no elaim was made by respondent for ex-
tras with respect thereto in the case at bar. There was 
no showing that the circumstances were the same or what 
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the circumstances were, under which the claimed pay-
ments on the roofing contracts were made. The argu-
ment seems to be that if appellant waived the provision 
in question in some other contract not before the Court, 
that he did so in eonnection with the same provision in the 
contracts in question. We do not believe that there is 
any rule of evidence which permits or allows such specu-
lative proof. 
(2) Also, over the objection of appellant the Court 
admitted in evidence an alleged open account for mate-
rials clai~med to have been delivered to appellant by re-
spondent, during the period o[ the construction of the 
houses in question (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 19). These ex-
hibits did not eonstitute any part of the system of accounts 
regularly kept by respondent in his business. They are 
paper baek books, including entries of items which are 
supposed to be extras delivered to appellant in connection 
with the performance of the contracts, (E~hibits 6 through 
11), and for the most part they were undated and in dif-
ferent handwriting. They were kept as a result of the 
above-mentioned secret oral conversations respondent 
claims to have had with Slavens, and appellant was never 
notified of their existence until three months after the last 
of the 61 houses was constructed and respondent began 
to assert his clai·rns for extras involved in the instant suit. 
Our position is that these are self-serving declarations 
which were erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial 
court. 
The law with respect to self-serving declarations is 
stated in 20 American Jurisprudence Section 558, begin-
ning at page 470: 
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"There is a general rule that self-serving declarations, 
defined as statements favorable to the interest of the 
declarant, are not admissible in evidence as proof of 
the facts asserted, whether they arose by implication 
fron1 acts and conduct or were made orally or reduced 
to writing. The vital objection to the admission of 
this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. Fur-
themore, such declarations are untrustworthy; to per-
n1it their introduction in evidence would open the door 
to frauds and perjuries . . . " 
See also Engemann v. Colonial Trust Company, etc. 
(1954) 378 Pa. 92, 105 A. 2d 347, 48 A.L.R. 2d 858, at 863; 
Stanton v. Stanton (1957) 213 Ga. 545, 100 SE 2d 289, 66 
A.L.R. 2d 1401 at 1409; 2 Jones Commentaries on Evi-
dence (2nd Edition), Section 895 pages 1636-37, and Sec-
tion 896 page 1640; Salt Lake City Brewing Company v. 
Hawke et al, 44 Utah 199 at 208, 66 Pac. 1058. 
It was pre,judicial error for the Court to admist such 
evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE CO,URT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIO,NS O~F LA \V AND JlJ1DG-
MENT, FINDING AND HOLDING THAT APPELLANT'S 
GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT HAD BOTIIi APP AR-
ENT AND ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRING A 
WRITING SIGNED BY APPELLANT FOR EXTRA MA-
TERIAL NOT CALLE.D FOR BY THE CONTRACT. 
THERE BEING NO· EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME. 
It is our poition that Slavens' contract as construc-
tion superintendent and the provision as to "additions and 
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deletions" in the contracts with respondent precludes find-
ing any apparent authority or actual authority in Slavens 
rto waive the extra provision in question. Respondent re-
Hes upon statements \Vhich Slavens is supposed to have 
made, but which he denied making, to respondent at his 
office. Respondent admits ·that he knew of the "additions 
and deletions" provision of the contract, but that the most 
he did to procure the wrirtrten authority of appellant was 
to make an attempt to call appellant by phone, which was 
unsuccessful. We have shown above that these state1nents 
were not admissible and that it was error for the Court 
to receive same in evidence. 
The record shows that appellant hired Slavens under 
a vvritten contract to supervise the construction of the 
building project. In all of the contracts made by appellant 
for the labor and materials that went into the construc-
tion, it provided that a writing was required in the event 
there were "additions or deletions" needed. Although re-
spondent well knew of this provision, he proceeded in the 
teeth of it to secretly make some claimed deal about ex-
tras with Slavens in which Slavens is .alleged to have made 
the alleged statement about his authority. The farthest 
respondent seems to have gone to procure the required 
writing, according to his own testimony, was to make an 
attempt to get in touch with appellant, which he never 
really accomplished. 
Exhibit 19, dated July 1, 1957, was never sent to ap-
pellant, and no such claim was ever disclosed to appellant 
during construction. All of the contracts in question made 
it clear to Slavens and the respondent, as well as all of the 
subcontractors, that if any ertra material or labor were 
needed, authority to put them into the project had to be 
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procured fron1 appellant in writing. This is not a case 
where appellant's construction superintendent was mak-
ing representation about his authority to some third par-
ty to procure materials. The most that can be made out 
of respondent's claim is, if the same were taken to be true, 
that he secretly furnished Slavens ~materials which he calls 
extras without ever contacting appellant at any time dur-
ing the existence of the contracts in question. However, 
respondent relied upon and tied his claimed extras into each 
one of the contracts in question, accepting payments and 
receiving same in full, and several months after such com-
pleted performance, he asserts a claim for extras. Sig-
nificantly, he did not send the claim to appellant, but 
rather mailed it to Slavens, who had completed his contract 
and was working in Blanding, Utah. Respondent wants 
us to believe that appellatJ.t indulged in some conduct from 
which it can be inferred that Slavens had actual or ap-
parent authority to do what respondent claims he did. We 
submit that the statements made by Slavens in his letter 
of January 27, 1958, attached to E'xhibit 31, correctly re-
fleets the situation when he said, "I need not say that the 
entire bill is utterly ridiculous''. It is our position that the 
trial court erred in admitting the extra-judicial oral dec-
larations of an agent whose authority \Vas limited by all 
of t,he contracts in question, and findings and Judgment 
based on such evidence should be reversed. 
The authorities eited w1der Point IT supra are again 
cited under this point. Also, we call attention to Hilyar 
v. Union Ice Cotlnpany (Cal. 1955) 286 P. 2d 21, at page 
28, involving a statement by the agent that he was "em-
ployed" by the principal where the Court observed as fol-
lmvs: 
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"In the case at bar, the uncontradicted facts show a 
wholesaler-retailer relationship. The only evidence to 
the contrary is Ingram's statement to the officer that 
he was "employed" by the Union Ice Company. In 
Fesler v. Rawlins, 43 Cal. App. 2d 541, 544, 111 P. 2 
380, 382, it was said: "It is axiomatic that agency 
cannot be established by the declarations of the agent 
not under oath or in the presence of the principal. 
As stated in 1 Cal. Jur. 698, 'if the rule were other-
wise any rogue ~could use the name of an honest man 
to facilitate his roguery'." See, also, Mechem Out-
lines Agency, 3d Ed., Para. 112, p. 68." 
Also in Brownell v. Tidewater Associated Oil Com-
pany (1941) 121 F. 2d 239 beginning at the bottom of 
page 243, the Court had the following to say on the mat-
ter of the agent's extra-judicial declarations as proving 
agency: 
"The trial judge stated that he was satisfied that there 
was no authority in any of the employees to make any 
agreement to enter into the contract which the plain-
tiffs claim was made. We agree. There was no evi-
dence of any sort given to establish the actual au-
thority of Mr. Whelan except his own alleged state-
ment that he had such authority. It is, of course, 
well settled, as the judge ruled at the trial, that agen-
cy ,and authority cannot be proved by the hearsay 
statements of the alleged agent himself. Orvis v. 
George, 5 Cir., 47 F. 2d 1045, 1931; E. A. Strout 
Farm Agency v. Hosford, 81 N. H. 507, 128 A. 685, 
1925; Bohanan v. Boston & Maine R. R., 70 N. H. 
526, 49 A. 103, 1901; Am. L. Inst. Restatement of 
Agency Para. 285. There was no competent evidence 
to submit to the jury proving that Mr. Whelan had 
any actual authority to make a binding agreement 
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to enter into a commission agency agreement with 
the plaintiffs.'' 
The same Court then went on to say as to apparent 
authority the following: 
"Nor do we believe that there was sufficient evidence 
to justify a jury in finding that Mr. Whelan had ap-
parent authority to enter into the alleged agreement. 
The actions of the principal and the knowledge of a 
reasonable man in the position of the ~third person are 
the important factors in establishing apparent au-
thority. The New Hampshire court has defined ap-
parent authority as "that authority which a reason-
ably prudent man, induced by the principal's acts and 
conduct, in the exercise of reasonable diligence and 
sound discretion, under similar circumstances, with the 
party dealing with the agent, and \vith like knowl-
edge, would naturally suppose the agent to have". 
Atto v. Saunders, 77 N. H. 527, 529, 93 A. 1037, 
1039, 1915. ln Davison v. Parks, 79 N. H. 262, 263, 
108 A. 288, 289, 1919, the court said that in order 
to find aparent authority it \Vas necessary to show 
"that the principal has either so conducted his busi-
ness as to give third parties the right to believe that 
the act in question is one he has allthorized his agent 
to do, or that it is one agents in that line of business 
are accustomed to do". Cf. Sullivan v. John H·ancock 
Mutual Lif..e lnsurance Co., 86 N.H. 184. 165 A. 277, 
1933. We do not believe that the plaintiffs have come 
w lthin these rules.'' 
We conclude that there is no valid evidence to sup-
port the findings and judgment entered by the trial court 
and therefore same should be reversed and set aside. 
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POINT V 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE "LAW OF THE CASE" 
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE COURT FROM CO·NSID-
ERING APPELLANT'S POINTS MADE HEREIN DE-
SPITE THE ADVERSE HO·UDING ON THE FIRST AP-
PEAL. 
At the conclusion of the first trial of the instant case 
on motion of defendant, Payne and Day, Inc., the trial 
court made an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. No 
findings were made as provided by 41 (b) U. R. C. P. 
Plaintifif appealed from the order of dismissal. The only 
issue before this Court on its first appeal was "Did plain-
tiff's evidence, when considered in the light most favor-
able to him, show ·that he was entitled to relief?" The 
Court then reviewed the record in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff and held that the "Oourt could reason-
ably have found" for the plaintiff. There was no evidence 
in the record adduced by the defendant, and the only evi-
dence considered was that of plaintiff. No issues of law 
were raised by the appeal other than a eonsideration of 
the evidence in the most favorable light to the plaintiff. 
The Court's function on the first appeal, therefore, was 
a consideration of the facts found in the record, which the 
Court was compelled to construe in favor of plaintiff. 
The "law of the case" doctrine is stated in 3 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, Section 985, beginning page 541 as fol-
lows: 
" .. The decisions agree that as a general rule, when 
an appellate court passes upon a question and remands 
the cause for further proceedings, the question there 
settled becomes the "law of the case" upon a subse-
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quent appeal, provided the same facts and issues which 
were determined in the previous appeal are involved 
in the second appeal. But if the facts are different, 
so that the principles of law announced on the first 
appeal are not applicable, as where there are mate-
rial changes in the evidence, pleadings or findings, a 
prior decision is not conclusive upon questions pre-
sented on the subsequent appeal; . . . '' 
See also ibid., Section 1000, page 553. 
The Utah law is in accord with the foregoing general 
rule. In Petty v. Clark (1948) 113 Ut. 205, 192 P. 2d 589, 
our Supreme Court recognized the general rule but refused 
to apply the "law of the ease" doctrine where the issues 
were different on the second appeal. In the first trial the 
jury found in favor of the defendant and the trial court 
disregarded the jury's findings and held for the plaintiff. 
On fi:tst appeal, the case was reversed on the grounds that 
the issues were legal and not equitable, and therefore the 
court was bound by the findings. The case was remanded 
for a new trial, and the legislature pased an amendment 
bet\veen the two trials making the findings of the jw--y in 
such a case advisory only. At the conclusion of the sec-
ond trial, the jury again found i1·1 favor of the defendant 
and so did the judge who tried the case the second time. 
On the second appeal. this Court refused to apply the doc-
trine of the "law of the case" because that "doctrine [does 
not] require us to adhere to our former decision on this 
question." The reason assigned was that the amendment 
made by the Legislature between the two trials changed 
the "poHcy of the law" and that the change was proced-
ural only and not substantive. It would seem that the 
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Court meant by this that the issues considered in the first 
appeal had been changed by the amendment when it came 
before the Court on the second appeal. 
We submit that in the instant case the issues in the 
second appeal are different from the single issue consid-
ered on the first appeal. There the only issue was con-
sidering the plaintiff's evidence and indicating what fav-
orable findings might have been reasonably made for plain-
tiff; whereas, in the second appeal, the evidence of both 
the plaintiff and defendant were in the record to be 
weighed and considered in the light of same having been 
admitted over the objections of the parties. Serious is-
sues of law are raised by defendant's insistence upon the 
parol evidence rule and that the extra-judicial oral state-
ments of an agent are not binding on his principal under 
the facts of this case, the trial court having overruled and 
deined defendant's objection in this regard. Also, this ap-
peal presents the issue of law as to the alleged agent's ap-
parent authority, which the trial court fiound to exist over 
appellant's objection and without any foundation in the evi-
dence. Also, we now raise on this appeal the issue of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, conclu-
sions, and judgment that the agent had either real or appar-
ent authority to waive the provision of the contracts requir-
ing that appellant would not be bound for "additions" (ex-
tras) unless respondent procured a writing. We submit that 
tmder these circumstances, the first appeal did not deter-
mine the major issues which are before this Court on the 
second appeal, and therefore the "law of the case" doctrine 
does not apply here. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court erred in (1) allowing in evi-. 
dence extra-judicial statements of the appellant's construc-
tion superintendent, Slavens, the effect of which was to 
extend his authority, (2) allowing in evidence ornl and 
written statements which varied the "additions and dele-
tions'' pro~sion of the contracts in question in violation 
of the parol evidence rule, (3) admitting incompetent and 
self-serving ,evidence, both written and oral, of the account 
for additions or extras where no compliance with the terms 
of the written contract were shown, and (4) by making 
and ente,ring findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judg-
ment based upon evidence erroneously admitted at the tri-
al, we eonclude that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed and the case should be remanded to the trial 
court with directions that same be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
GEORGE E. BALLIF 
For BALLIF AND BALLIF 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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